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
15 October 1959

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN



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DAILY BRIEF

I. THE COMMUNIST BLOC

o/c
USSR - Communist China: Pavel Yudin, Soviet ambassador to Communist China since December 1953, has been replaced by a relatively obscure Ukrainian party secretary, Stepan Chervonenko. Yudin, once one of the Soviet Union's top ideologists, was due for reassignment and has been absent from his post for long periods during the past two years. Chervonenko accompanied Khrushchev on the Chinese trip and was apparently designated for the job well in advance of the official announcement. Yudin's transfer, therefore, may be routine. However, the action, coming at a time when Sino-Soviet relations apparently are strained, and the obscurity of the replacement, could be further indications of irritation between Peiping and Moscow.

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


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Watch Committee Conclusions: [Situations susceptible of direct exploitation by Sino-Soviet bloc action which would jeopardize US interests exist in Laos and in the Middle East, particularly in Iraq.]

Laos: [Dissident activity has remained at a low level. The dissidents, however, with probable North Vietnamese assistance, continue to have the objective of establishing themselves in a strong position which they could use as the basis for political bargaining or for the expansion of military operations.]

Middle East: [The situation in Iraq remains tense. While order has been well maintained, factional strife may break out and further attempts against Qasim are possible. In these circumstances, the UAR may become more deeply involved.] ()



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DAILY BRIEF

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